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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE MAXINE B. NICKEL TRUST, dba 
PALATIAL LIVING MOBILE HOME 
PARK, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
-vs-
CRAIG CARLSEN, also known as 
D. CRAIG CARLSEN, also known as 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
-vs-
J.S. OLSEN; BILL (Last name unknown); 
TAWNYA FRANCKOWIAK, Individually 
and in her capacity as Manager of Palatial 
Living; LYLE COOPER; MILES P. 
JENSEN; OLSON & HOGAN, a 
Professional Corporation; and JOHN and 
JANE DOES, I through XX, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon Utah Court of Appeal under assignment by the 
1 
Case No. 20070621-CA 
District Court Case No. 040100970 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in this matter under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
I. Whether the Reviewing Judge's Decision on the Affidavit of Prejudice was 
improperly influenced and tainted by the Palatial Living's written Objections which were 
not appropriately filed under Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
improperly submitted to the court for a decision under Rule 7, and whether the Affidavit 
was sufficient to disqualify Judge Hadfield. Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023, (Utah 
App. 1993); and Young v. Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1996). 
The standard of review to review this issue on appeal is that a judge's authority to 
review the affidavit under Rule 63(b) is a question of law that the appellate court reviews 
for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. Pugh v. Dozzo-Hughes, 2005 
UTApp 203,^1 17, 112 P.3d 1247. 
Carlsen adequately preserved this issue for appeal by filing a Reply Memorandum 
to Palatial Living's Objections to the Affidavit of Prejudice and by filing Objections to 
Palatial Living's Notice to Submit their Objections to the trial court for a decision. (R. 
409, 424, 463, 470, 480, 483, and 946). 
II. Whether the trial erred in granting the Palatial Living's motion for summary 
judgment because the court reviewed the evidence and all reasonable inference in the 
light most favorable to them rather than Carlsen and Palatial Living was not entitled to 
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summary judgment as a matter of law. Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-16-9; § 57-16-4; 57-15-12. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. 
Peebles, 2000 UT App 314, 14 P.3d 105, affirmed, 2002 UT 48, Iflf 28-32, 48 P.3d 968; 
Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT If 21, 4 P.3d 783; Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1986); Dean v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235; King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 
1114 (Utah 1955); Rancho Santa Paula Mobile home Park v. Evans, 26 Cal. App. 4th 
1139, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d 464 (Cal App. Dist. 2, 1994); Pleasant View Campground, Inc. v. 
Hood, 120 N.H. 86, 411 A.2d 1104 (N.H. 1980); and Mobile Home Brokers, Inc. v. 
Alvin Colvin, Jr. dba, Lazy Oaks Mobile Home Park, 566 S.W.2d 68 (Tex App. 1978). 
The standard of review to review7 this issue on appeal is that an appellate court 
reviews the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment for correctness, 
affording no deference to the trial court. Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 
UT 70 Tf 21, 98 P.3d 540. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R.Civ. 56(c). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98 TJ 3, 104 P.3d 1208. 
Carlsen adequately preserved this issue for appeal by filing a Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Strike Palatial Living's 
Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment as being in non compliance 
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with Rule 7 and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1292, 1298, 1300, 
1304, 1310, 1349, 1360). 
III. Whether Carlsen was denied his rights to access to the courts as provided 
under Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution when the trial court failed to render a 
decision on all issues in his counterclaim and his Third-Party Complaint. Whether 
Carlsen was also denied his rights to access to the courts when he was denied access to 
the records in this case when the record was transferred from the Clerk of the Court of the 
First District Court of Cache County to the Clerk of the Court of the First District Court 
of Box Elder County in violation of Rule 4-205(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-30 when no change of venue was granted 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-11, and no appeal was pending. 
The standard of review to review this issue on appeal is that an appellate court 
reviews a question of law for correctness and affords no deference to the trial court. 
Pugh v. Dozzo-Hughes, 2005 UT App 203, H 17, 112 P.3d 1247. 
Carlsen adequately preserved this issue for appeal by filing Objections to the 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment. (R. 1360). 
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's two 
motion to amend the counterclaim based upon newly discovered evidence. The January 
30, 2001 letter from Palatial Living's attorney to Brannick Larsen, Shi Dean, and Lyle 
Cooper. [Exhibit V] (R. 696, 703). Rule 15(a) mandates that leave to amend pleadings 
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"shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R.Civ.P 15(a). Moreover, "rule 15 
should be interpreted liberally so as to allow7 parties to have their claims fully adjudicated. 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). 
The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion. 
Kasco Servs. Corp., Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). 
Carlsen adequately preserved this issue for appeal by filing two different motions 
to amend the third-party complaint and counterclaim with supporting memoranda. (R. 
272, 347, 365, 696, 703, and 780). 
V. Whether the trial court violated the provisions of Rule 77(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure by conducting hearings over Carlsen's written and verbal objections 
outside the county in which the matter was pending in Cache County, State of Utah. 
The standard of review to review this issue on appeal is that an appellate court 
reviews a question of law for correctness and affords no deference to the trial court. 
Pugh v. Dozzo-Hughes, 2005 UT App 203, If 17, 112 P.3d 1247. 
Carlsen adequately preserved this issue for appeal by filing written Objections to 
the hearings being held outside of Cache County. (R. 826). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following determinative constitutional, statutory, and rules are set out 
verbatim in the Addendum. 
Utah Mobile Home Residency Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-1, et seq. 
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Utah Code Ann. §57-16-2. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-16-7. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-16-9. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-16-12. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-16-13. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-512. 
Utah Code Ann. §53-13-103. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-30. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-13-11. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 77 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 4-205(3). Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Rule 3-104 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 3-108 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
This is an appeal from Order Granting Summary' Judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
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and against the defendant on all issues in the Defendant's Counterclaim from the First 
Judicial District Court of Cache County, State of Utah, Case No. 040100970. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
This appeal involves a counterclaim regarding a dispute between a mobile home 
park and a tenant under the Mobile Home Residency Act. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the mobile home park 
against the tenant on all issues in the counterclaim including issues that were not raised in 
the Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. The pleadings in this case shows that the mobile home located at 481 West 640 
North, Logan, Utah was sold to the Carlsen on June 6, 2001 by the lienholder. Lyle 
Cooper, under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 57-16-9, after the mobile home 
had previously been abandoned by the previous owner, Brannick Larsen and his family. 
"Defendant's Exhibit "FT incorporated into defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings making reference to Brannick Larsen and Our File 
No.N-4300.15."(R. 127, 129). 
2. Carlsen entered into Earnest Money Receipt and Real Estate Purchase Contract 
on May 30, 2001 through the Brokerage Firm of Town and Country Real Estate, to 
purchase upon condition of Palatial Living acceptance and immediate possession, a 1974 
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Hacienda, Model 519, Mobile Home, VIN # 518733U/X which is located at 481 West 
640 North, Logan, Utah, from Lyle Cooper. Shi Dean was not a licensed motor vehicle 
dealer under the laws of the State of Utah at the time of the sale of the mobile home. The 
Earnest Money Receipt and Purchase Agreement is marked Defendant's Exhibit "A*' 
which is attached to the original Counterclaim and made a part thereof. (R. 017). There 
was no disclosure by the real estate broker and agent, Shi Dean to Carlsen, before 
entering into the earnest money purchase agreement of the contents of a January 30, 2001 
letter which informed her and the lienholder, Lyle Cooper that Palatial Living Mobile 
Home Park demanded that the mobile home be moved from the park or substantial repairs 
made to the home before being sold. No repairs were made by Lyle Cooper during the 
period between January 30, 2001 and May 30, 2001. 
3. Carlsen on the 30th day of May. 2001, submitted an application for a lease 
agreement to Palatial Living Management, together with a excellent credit report that 
verified his employment. Carlsen was required to pay a $ 25.00 application fee to Palatial 
Living. There was no disclosure to Carlsen at the time of Palatial Living accepting the 
lease application and receiving the $ 25.00 fee of the contents of the January 30, 2001 
letter from Palatial Living to Brannick Larsen, Lyle Cooper and Shi Dean. Palatial 
Living demanded under paragraph number three (3) of the letter that the mobile home be 
moved or substantial repairs made to the home before being sold. The January 30, 2001 
letter which is incorporated as Defendant's Exhibit wwV"into the defendant's proposed 
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Second Amended Counterclaim (R. 696, 703), was not known to Carlsen and was 
discovered by Carlsen through discovery in this pending case. There was no prior 
disclosure by Palatial Living at the time of submitting the lease application of the 
requirement of a $ 380.00 security deposit nor was there any disclosure by Palatial Living 
of the Rules and Regulations that would be required to abide by if the application for a 
lease was approved. The Mobile Home Residency Act was not posted in a conspicuous 
place in the park and were not furnished to Carlsen. The Rules & Regulations were not 
disclosed until six weeks after Carlsen purchased the mobile home on June 6, 2001. 
3. Lyle Cooper and Shi Dean of Town & Country Real Estate during the period of 
the sale of said mobile home were represented by Stephen W. Jewell Attorney at Law 
and Carlsen at such time was not represented by counsel. 
4. An inspection of said mobile home occurred on the 6th day of June, 2001 
between Palatial Living, Lyle Cooper, Shi Dean, and their attorney, Stephen Jewell. 
Carlsen having previously submitted a lease application to Palatial Living on May 30, 
200 L which gave notice that he intended to purchase the mobile home was not given any 
notice by Palatial Living or any other party of such inspection. 
5. An Addendum to the Earnest Money Purchase Agreement prepared by the Real 
Estate Broker. Shi Dean was entered into between Carlsen and Lyle Cooper after the 
inspection of the mobile home on the 6lh day of June. 2001. The Addendum disclosed 
that the siding and porch on the east side of the mobile home would be painted by Carlsen 
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and Lyle Cooper would furnish the paint. Lyle Cooper was to replace the north west 
corner seam. The Addendum also disclosed that the skirting on the south side would need 
to be replaced and Carlsen agreed to pay $ 300.00 for such skirting. Lyle Cooper was to 
replace the outside carpet on the eastside porch and repair the porch of which he failed to 
do so. The Addendum is marked as Defendant's Exhibit WTT which is attached to the 
original Counterclaim. (R. 017). Carlsen affirmatively asserted in the trial court that Lyle 
Cooper failed to make any repairs other than furnishing paint and his partial payment 
toward the skirting to be replaced. Cooper failed to replace the carpet on the porch, repair 
the porch, and the north west corner post was not replaced by Cooper. 
6. Carlsen on the 6th day of June, 2001 entered into an Installment Promissory 
Note, whereby he agreed to pay Lyle Cooper the sum of $ 32,500.00, on monthly 
installments of $ 300.00 per month at a interest rate of 9.35% for the mobile home located 
at 481 West 640 North. Logan, Utah. Lyle Cooper on the 6th day of June, 2001 also 
executed a Bill of Sale. The Installment Promissory Note is marked Defendant's Exhibit 
WWC" and the Bill of Sale is marked Defendant's Exhibit *TT which is attached to the 
original Counterclaim. (R. 017). Carlsen was thereupon informed by Shi Dean that it 
would be a couple of days before he could move into the mobile home. 
7. Carlsen as a condition of acceptance by Palatial Living as the new owner and 
permitting him to move in was required to execute an agreement on June 13, 2001 to 
make numerous repairs to the mobile home that substantially differ from the disclosure of 
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repairs in the Addendum to the Earnest Money Purchase Agreement. Defendant's Exhibit 
WWE" which is attached to the original Counterclaim. (R. 017). 
8. Carlsen as a condition to acceptance by Palatial Living as the new owner and 
permitting him to move in was also required to execute an additional agreement on June 
13, 2001, to reside the entire mobile home that he was required to repair and paint before 
the mobile home could be subsequently sold. Defendant's Exhibit "F" which is attached 
to the original Counterclaim. (R. 017). This agreement prevented and barred Carlsen 
from selling the mobile home since June 13, 2001. Furthermore, the parks rules 
prevented Carlsen from renting the mobile home. Carlsen was informed thereafter by the 
Real Estate Broker, Shi Dean that he could move into the mobile home. Carlsen moved 
into the mobile home and discovered that his move in occurred over Palatial Living's 
objections. 
9. Carlsen, two months after submitting his lease application, entered into a lease 
agreement with Palatial Living on the 27lh day of July. 2001 and at that time was required 
to pay a $ 380.00 security deposit. The lease is incorporated into Palatial Living's 
complaint. (R. 003). 
10. While Carlsen was in good faith working on and making repairs on the west 
side of the mobile home on August 6, 2001, he received a letter attached to the door on 
the east side of the mobile home from the manager. Tawnya Franckowiak. The letter 
demanded that he make repairs to the mobile home that he was in the process of making. 
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Carlsen on August 7, 2001, received an identical letter through the United States Mail, 
both letters having original signatures. Defendant's Exhibit taWGl" and Exhibit "G2" 
w7hich is attached to the original Counterclaim. (R. 017). 
11. Carlsen thereafter received a letter, dated, August 9, 2001 from the attorney 
representing Palatial Living authorizing an extension of time at the request of Stephen 
Jewell, attorney for Lyle Cooper. Defendant's Exhibit WTF which is attached to the 
original Counterclaim. (R. 017). This letter placed a condition for an extension of time 
to make repairs to require Carlsen and not Lyle Cooper to make additional repairs that 
were not included the repair document dated June 13, 2001. (R. 017, Defendant's 
Exhibit UE"). 
12. Carlsen on August 13, 2001, received a Notice from the manager, Tawnya 
Franckowiak, demanding that Carlsen remove his vehicle from the park and repair his 
vehicle because of a minor power steering fluid leak before returning the vehicle to the 
park property. Exhibit WWF which is attached to the original Counterclaim. (R.017). 
Carlsen's vehicle at the time was parked on a roadway inside Palatial Living that had 
previously been maintained and resurfaced by the Logan City Street Department and was 
a right of way for adjacent property owners who were not living inside Palatial Living 
Mobile Home Park.. 
13. Carlsen as ordered by Tawnya Franckowiak, caused repairs to be made to his 
vehicle in the sum of $ 413.63. Defendant's Exhibit "J" which is attached to the original 
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Counterclaim. (R. 017). 
14. Carlsen since June 6, 2001, did make substantial upgrades and improvements 
to the mobile home such as replacement of a 28 year old water heater; replacement and 
upgrade of the cook top; replacement and upgrade of the fan over the cook top; 
replacement of heat tape; replacement of west side exterior light fixture; replacement of 
furnace room door for better ventilation; repairs to both toilets and swamp cooler; a 
substantial amount of caulking and insulation, both inside and outside of the mobile 
home; substantial repairs and painting of both the east side and west side porches and he 
was required to pay for such paint; caulking and painting of the entire exterior siding of 
mobile home; painting of the exterior of the east side door; repair of the northwest seam; 
payment of $ 300.00 towards skirting of entire mobile home; removal of all creeping 
vines; substantial changes in landscape; and the painting of the door and roof to storage 
shed. 
15. During the entire period of Carlsen's tenancy, he has received numerous 
documents from the Palatial Living Management attached to his door. Defendant's 
Exhibits Kl, K2, K3, K4, K5, and K6 attached to the original Counterclaim. (R. 017). 
The documents shows an unauthorized exercise, dominion and control over Carlsen's 
personal property to exclusion of or inconsistent with his ownership rights as follows: 
(a). Unauthorized dominion and control over Carlsen's heat tape and its use and 
the conversion of the electricity used for the heat tape that Carlsen purchased directly 
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from Logan City Utilities. The documents informed Carlsen when to turn on and off the 
heat tapes. That such dominion and control over the use of the heat tape would be similar 
to a landlord telling a tenant when they can turn on and off their lights when the 
electricity is purchased by the tenant directly from a utility company. 
(b). Unauthorized dominion and control over the water that Carlsen purchased 
directly from Logan City Utilities. The documents informed Carlsen at what time of the 
day that he could water the lawn, but Palatial Living violated their own water restrictions 
policies by watering the lawns in vacant spaces during their prohibited hours. Carlsen's 
water was purchased directly from Logan City. (R. 017, Defendant's Exhibit "K3M, f^ 4. 
Defendant's Exhibit "K6'\ K 4). 
(c). Unauthorized dominion and control over Carlsen's swamp cooler and its use. 
(d). Unauthorized dominion and control over the Carlsen's garden hoses and their 
use. The documents would instruct Carlsen as to when to place the garden hose in the 
storage building. 
(e). Unauthorized dominion and control over the defendant's Dish Network 
Satellite System whereby such dominion and control is preempted by FCC Regulations, 
47 C.F.R. Section 1.4000. (R. 017, Defendant's Exhibit ^K6M, 1j 7). See, FCC Fact Sheet 
at page 8. Franckowiak under f 14, § I of the Rules and Regulations, ordered the Carlsen 
to remove his satellite system when he first installed in the year 2001, and at a time when 
a substantial number of other Palatial Living residents had a dish satellite system. Upon 
14 
furnishing Franckowiak with the FCC Fact Sheet, Carlsen was ordered to move the 
satellite dish from the storage shed that he owned to a different location in violation of the 
FCC rule as per Defendant's Exhibit WT" and Defendant's Exhibit "U" attached to 
defendant's proposed Second Amended Counterclaim. (R. 696, 703). Carlsen requested 
the trial court to take Judicial Notice of the contents of Defendant's Exhibit WT" and 
Defendant's Exhibit fc'LT regarding satellite dish systems in mobile home parks. 
(f). Unauthorized dominion and control over the Carlsen's mobile home and its 
use. 
16. Palatial Living, together with Lyle Cooper and Shi Dean on the 21st day of 
April, 2004, without any valuable consideration, attempted to obtain possession, title, and 
ownership rights to Carlsen's mobile home and personal property. Palatial Living 
through their attorney, together with Lyle Cooper, and Shi Dean attempted to have the 
lien holder's attorney, Stephen Jewell, sign a stipulation without any notice to Carlsen, 
authorizing conveyance of his title and possession of such personal property to the lien-
holder, Lyle Cooper without any consideration, and without payment for any required 
repairs and improvements made by Carlsen as per Defendant's Exhibit "P" attached to the 
original Counterclaim. (R. 017). 
17. The court separated the Palatial Living's complaint from Carlsen's 
counterclaim which included a third-party complaint and a demand for a jury trial. (R. 
780, 959). 
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Carlsen filed two motions to amend the counterclaim and third-party complaint, 
but each motion was denied by the trial court. (R. 266, 272, 696, 703, 780, 959) The 
third-party complaint was dismissed by the court upon Palatial Living's motion and not 
upon the motion of any third-party defendants. (R. 335, 375, 780, 959). 
18. Judge Hadfield was assigned to the case on July 1, 2004. 
19. Upon discovery of Judge Hadfield's assignment to the case, Carlsen filed a 
Motion for a Change of Judge and Affidavit of Prejudice against Judge Hadfield on July 
26, 2004. (R. 409) and a Certificate of Good Faith (R. 424). 
20. Palatial Living filed Objections to the Motion for Change of Judge and 
Affidavit of Prejudice on August 5, 2004. (R. 463). Palatial Living's objections related to 
other cases involving Carlsen of which Judge Hadfield was not assigned. (R. 463). 
21. Carlsen filed a Reply Memorandum to Palatial Living's Objections to 
Carlsen's Motion to Disqualify Judge Hadfield on August 9, 2004. (R. 470). 
22. Palatial Living under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, filed a 
Notice to Submit for Decision on August 14, 2007, Carlsen" s Affidavit of Prejudice 
together with their Objections and Carlseif s Reply. (R. 480). 
23. Carlsen filed Objections to the Palatial Living's Notice to Submit the 
Affidavit of Prejudice for Decision as being in contravention to Rule 63(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure on August 16, 2004. (R. 483). 
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24. Judge Hadfield entered an Order Certifying Motion and Affidavit to a 
Reviewing Judge for Decision on October 14, 2004. (R. 726). 
25. Judge Jones entered an Opinion on November 24, 2004 denying Carlsen's 
Motion for Change of Judge and Affidavit of Prejudice. (R. 763). 
26. An Order and Findings Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Hadfield was entered on February 1, 2005. (R. 946). 
27. Upon Judge Hadfield's assignment to this case, the entire record was 
transferred by the Clerk of the Court for Cache County to the Clerk of the Court of the 
Court for Box Elder County. The record in this case remained in the possession of the 
Clerk of the Court for Box Elder County after Judge Hadfield granted a final decision by 
entering a Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of Palatial Living and against 
Carlsen on his counterclaim. (R.1355, 1368). The record reflects that Carlsen was denied 
complete access to and copies of documents in the record of this case because of the 
transfer of the record. (R. 1375). 
28. The trial court during the pendency of this matter gave notice and conducted 
numerous hearings over Carlseif s written objections in the courtroom in Box Elder 
County wherein the case was filed and pending in the First Judicial District Court of 
Cache County, State of Utah. (R. 810, 812, and 826). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Carlsen first claims that Judge Fladfield's assignment to this case was improper. 
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Carlsen next argues that Palatial Living improperly filed Objections to his Affidavit of 
Prejudice against Judge Hadfield to improperly taint and prejudice the reviewing judge in 
determining the legal sufficiency of the Affidavit. Carlsen also argues that the Affidavit 
of Prejudice was legally sufficient to disqualify Judge Hadfield. 
II. Carlsen argues that the trial courf s granting of summary judgment in favor of 
Palatial Living on Carlsen's Counterclaim was improper because Judge Hadfield viewed 
all evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of Palatial Living rather than Carlsen. 
Carlsen next argues that Palatial Living was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
III. Carlsen argues that he was denied access to the court under Article I, § 11 of 
the Utah Constitution and his right to a jury trial by Palatial Living being granted 
summary judgment on all seven counts in the counterclaim when their Motion and 
Memorandum for Summary Judgment addressed only three of the seven counts. Carlsen 
also argues that he was denied access to the courts by being deprived of access to the 
court records in the case. 
IV. Carlsen argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Motion 
to Amend his Counterclaim and b) dismissing his Third-Party Complaint upon the motion 
of Palatial Living who lacked any standing. 
V. Carlsen argues that the trial court erred by conducting numerous hearing in 
Box Elder County over Carlseif s objections when the matter was pending in Cache 
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County in violation of Rule 77 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE REVIEWING JUDGE WAS TAINTED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S 
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE RULE 63(b) MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT 
THAT WAS SUFFICIENT TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE HADFIELD. 
As a threshold matter, Carlsen claimed in his Objections to the Proposed Order 
Implementing the Memorandum Decision of December 15, 2004 (R. 815), that this case 
was transferred to Judge Hadfield on July 1, 2004 when he was not appropriately assigned 
by the presiding judge, associate presiding judge, or by any person with any authority to 
assign him as required under Rule 3-104, and Rule 3-108 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration which is reversible error. Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley, 2000 UT 27, TJ 
16. 
It is Carlsen's contention that there was no legal basis for Palatial Living's written 
Objections to Carlsen's Motion for Change of Judge and Affidavit of Prejudice. 
Carlsen filed a Motion for Change of Judge and Affidavit of Prejudice against 
Judge Hadfield together with a Certificate of Good Faith upon his discovery that Judge 
Hadfield was assigned to the case. Palatial Living filed written Objections to the Motion 
for a Change of Judge and Affidavit of Prejudice. Paragraph four (4) of their written 
objections makes reference to a Logan City Municipal Justice Court case no. CLC CR-M-
01-00559 involving Carlsen but did not involve Judge Hadfield where Palatial Living 
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claims Carlsen had Judge Cheryl A. Russell disqualified and excused on July 20, 2001. 
The record in that case shows that Palatial Living's claims is not true in that Judge 
Russell recused herself from the case before any proceedings because she was previously 
a Logan City Prosecutor against Carlsen. 
Palatial Living under paragraph four (4) of their written Objections states as a fact 
from the records that during proceedings before that court, Carlsen made threats 
regarding Judge Stevens. These allegations are not true and should have been stricken 
under Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Carlsen did file a Motion for 
Change of Judge and Affidavit Prejudice against Judge Stevens in that case and Judge 
Stevens without certifying the matter to another judge to determine the legal sufficiency 
of the affidavit, recused himself from the case. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Young v. Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1996) 
stated: 
In Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023) (Utah App. 1993), the court of appeals 
correctl) observed, "The clear import of Rule 63(b) is that a judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed must either recuse him or herself, or if he or she questions the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, certify the matter to another named judge for a ruling on its 
legal sufficiency." Id. at 1025. That court also correctly held that it was improper for the 
certification order to contain what amounted to argument or comment on the necessity for 
disqualification, including in that case references to decisions by the referring judge in 
other cases. 
Palatial Living's written Objections to Carlseif s Affidavit of Prejudice against 
Judge Hadfield was submitted by Palatial Living to the court for a decision under Rule 7 
U.R.Civ.P. over Carlseif s written objections. It is Carlseif s contention that their 
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Objections was submitted in an improper attempt to influence, taint, and prejudice the 
reviewing judge when he reviewed their written objections and the Affidavit of Prejudice. 
Because it is improper for a judge certifying an Affidavit of Prejudice to a 
reviewing judge to include matters relating to other cases, it should also be improper for 
Palatial Living to perform the same acts that a certifying judge is prohibited under Rule 
63(b). 
To support a claim of bias based on a judge's presiding over prior proceedings, "it 
must appear that apart from the judge's analysis of the issues of fact or law in those 
proceedings, he had such a bias in favor of one party or prejudice against the other that he 
could not fairly and impartially determine the issues.: Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 
742 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Ordenville Irrig. Co. v. Glendate Irrig. Co., 17 Utah2d 
282, 288, 409 P.2d 616, 621 (1965); this is, the affidavit must allege facts indicating that 
"the judge's behavior toward a party during those prior proceedings was extreme" and 
reflected a "deep seated antagonism" toward the party requesting recusal. State, In re 
M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998). 
Carlseif s Affidavit of Prejudice states facts that Judge Hadfield's conduct in two 
other cases involving Carlsen was extreme and reflected a deep seated antagonism 
towards Carlsen that warrants his disqualification in this case. 
Carlseif s Affidavit states that he verily believed Judge Hadfield was bias and 
prejudice against him because he denied each and every motion, request, and objection 
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made by Carlsen in those two cases. The record in the instant case reflects that Judge 
Hadfield with the exception of partially granting a motion in limine has denied each and 
every motion, request and objection made by Carlsen. 
Carlsen further states in his Affidavit that he verily believed Judge Hadfield was 
bias and prejudice against Carlsen by his failure to render decisions in the Riley case on 
Carlsen's Objections to proposed Orders relating to Memorandum Decisions of the court 
for a period of over two years. That Judge Hadfield caused the record to be removed 
from the Clerk of the Court in Cache County to Box Elder County whereupon Carlsen 
was denied access to the records and to copies of documents and Judge Hadfield's 
conduct prevented him from timely prosecuting the Riley case pending before Judge 
Hadfield. 
Carlsen Affidavit states that Judge Hadfield in a Circuit Court case allowed a 
prosecution witness. Tim Gil Duron in open court and on the record to impersonate a 
peace officer to deceive the jury which constitutes a criminal offense in the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-512. Duron testified that on the date of the trial in that case that 
he was employed by the United States Forest Service as a laborer and he was not 
employed by any law enforcement agency in the State of Utah as a peace officer. Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-13-103. A trial judge clearly has the discretion to determine what 
evidence is admitted at any trial, but the Utah Constitution, rules or statutes does not 
authorize any judge in the State of Utah to allow a crime to be committed in the 
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courtroom to deceive and improperly influence a jury such as a person unlawfully 
impersonating a peace officer. 
Judge Hadfield's conduct in the two prior cases that is referenced in Carlsen's 
Affidavit of Prejudice shows that his conduct was extreme and reflected a deep seated 
antagonism towards Carlsen. 
The Defendant is not required to show actual bias, but is only required to show a 
reasonable appearance of bias to require recusal of the Judge Ben H. Hadfield under 
Canon 3E. State, Department of Human Services v, Oddone, 2004 UT 8, % 3, 84 P.2d 
1170. 
Carlsen's Affidavit of Prejudice was legally sufficient to require the 
disqualification of Judge Hadfield in this case. 
POINT II 
PALATIAL LIVING WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM. 
The pertinent part of Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
The Judgment Roll and Index in this case shows that there was substantial pre trial 
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discovery conducted between the parties. The Index also shows that Carlsen's deposition 
regarding his counterclaim was taken by Palatial Living's attorney in February, 2005. 
(R. 964, 988). 
Palatial Living in its Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment failed to include the deposition and other discovery material in support of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. It does appear that the trial court granted summary 
judgment based upon the pleadings while excluding the deposition and discovery 
material. 
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ. 56(c). When 
considering a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98 Tf 3. 104 P.3d 1208. 
The Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment shows that the trial court 
viewed the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of Palatial Living rather than in the 
light most favorable to Carlsen the non moving party. 
A. Palatial Living was not entitled to Summary Judgment under Count I of the 
Counterclaim. 
Carlsen claims under Count I of his Counterclaim that he is entitled to a judgment 
against Palatial Living for all damages caused by the unlawful agreement regarding 
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repairs to the mobile home that he was required to enter into as a condition of acceptance 
by Palatial Living as a resident that was in violation of the Utah Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act. 
It is a general rule that contracting parties are presumed to contract in reference to 
the existing law, indeed, they are presumed to have in mind all of the existing laws 
relating to the contract and or lease, or to the subject matter thereof. Thus, it is commonly 
said that all existing applicable or relevant and valid statutes, ordinances, regulations, and 
settled law of the land at the time a contract is made becomes a part of it and must be read 
into it just as if an express provision to the effect were inserted therein, except where the 
contract discloses a contrary intention. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). 
I 
Carlsen purchased the mobile home located at 481 West 640 North, Logan, Utah 
from the lienholder, Lyle Cooper on June 6, 2001. The mobile home had previously been 
abandoned by the previous owner, Brannick Larsen because of the failure to pay rent and 
when he and his family moved from the premises to Joseph City, Arizona in December, 
2000. 
The pertinent part of the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act under Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-16-9 provides as follows: 
(2) If the lienholder pays rent and service charges as provided by this section, the 
lienholder shall have the unconditional right to resell the mobile home within the park, 
subject to the purchaser being approved for residency by the park, which approval 
cannot be unreasonably withheld, and subject to Subsection (4). "Emphasis added" 
Subsection (4) provides: 
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(4) The mobile home park may require the lienholder to remove a mobile home 
covered by this section from the park if the mobile home, at the time of sale, is in 
rundown condition or in disrepair, if the mobile home does not meet the park's minimum 
size specifications, or if the mobile home does not comply with reasonable park rules. 
The lienholder shall have 60 days to make repairs and comply with park rules after 
notice of required repairs and rule violations is given the lienholder by the park 
owner or its agents. "Emphasis added" 
Lyle Cooper, the lienholder in this case, and his real estate agent, Shi Dean 
received a copy of the written notice by Miles P. Jensen, attorney for Palatial Living in a 
letter addressed to the former owners, Brannick and Emily Larsen, dated January 30, 
2001, [R. 696, 703, Defendant's Exhibit "V"] whereby under paragraph number three (3.) 
it states: Pursuant to paragraph 11 .b of the Lease, the Park has made the determination 
that the mobile home is not in sufficiently good condition to remain in the Park and is in 
disrepair and rundown condition and must be moved. The items which are unacceptable 
are the siding on the home, the skirting and east side porch. 
Page two of the January 30, 2001 letter, Exhibit "V" shows that both Lyle Cooper 
and Shi Dean received the letter and they were at that time in the process of selling the 
mobile home. There was no attempt by Lyle Cooper to make any repairs to the mobile 
home after receiving the letter of January 30, 2001 and when Carlsen entered into the 
Earnest Money Purchase Agreement to purchase the mobile home on May 30, 2001. 
There was no disclosure by Palatial Living to Carlsen of the contents of the January 30, 
2001 letter requiring removal or repairs to the mobile home when they accepted the lease 
application and the lease application fee of $ 25.00. The question arises as to why the 
26 
management of any mobile home park would accept a lease application and a fee while at 
the same time requesting the removal of the mobile home from the park. The Earnest 
Money Purchase Agreement, dated, May 30, 2001, and the Addendum to the Earnest 
Money Purchase, dated June 6, 2001 fails to disclose the contents of the January 30, 2001 
letter for the need of repairs or removal. The failure of Palatial Living, Lyle Cooper, and 
Shi Dean to disclose to Carlsen, the contents of the January 30, 2001 letter before 
accepting the lease application and Earnest Money Purchase Agreement clearly 
constitutes a fraudulent non-disclosure of a material defects of the mobile home. 
Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, 31 P.3d 572; Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1986); and Dean v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235. 
Carlsen alleged in his amended counterclaim that he would not have entered into 
the purchase agreement to purchase the mobile home and submitted the application for 
the lease agreement with Palatial Living Mobile Home Park if he had knowledge of the 
contents of the January 30, 2001 letter pertaining to removal or repairs to the mobile 
home. 
The pertinent part of Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4, provides: 
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or unreasonably limit the 
sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and unenforceable. The mobile 
home park may, however, reserve the right to approve the prospective purchaser of a 
mobile home who intends to become a resident, but such approval may not be 
unreasonably withheld. "Emphasis added" 
(8) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it may require that a 
mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if: 
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(a) the mobile home does not meet minimum size specifications; or 
(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair. 
The California Court has held under similar statutory provisions, that a mobile 
home park owner is compelled to accept as a new tenant a person who purchases a mobile 
home from an existing tenant unless the new tenant does not have the financial ability to 
pay rent or, based upon past tenancies, has demonstrated he or she will not comply with 
the park rules and regulations. (Civ. Code 798.74). Yee v. City ofEscondido, 224 Cal. 
App. 3d 1349, at 1352, 274 Cal Rptr. 551, (Cal. App. Dist. 4 (1974), affirmed 503 U.S. 
519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992). 
This is consistent with the decisions of the Utah Courts on the issue that approval 
may not be unreasonably withheld and the applicant clearly has a cause of action if 
approval is unreasonably withheld. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2000 
UT App 314, 14 P.3d 105, affirmed, 2002 UT 48, 1fl| 28-32, 48 P.3d 968. 
Carlsen's approval for residency was unreasonably withheld by Palatial Living 
Mobile Home Park. (R. 017, Defendant's Exhibit "E" and Exhibit "F" incorporated into 
Defendant Counterclaim). Carlsen claimed in his counterclaim that he was coerced and 
subjected to unlawful duress by being required to sign and execute both agreements for 
acceptance and approval for residency, dated June 13, 2001 after negotiations between 
Steve Jewell, attorney for the lienholder, Lyle Cooper and Palatial Living's attorney, 
Miles P. Jensen. 
The pertinent part of Defendant's Exhibit "E" (R. 017) states: 
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Dear Steve: This will confirm our agreement and understanding reached by 
telephone on Tuesday, June 12, 2001 in the above-captioned matter. As a condition to 
acceptance of the new owner and permitting him to move into the park, he has agreed as 
follows: 
The pertinent part of Defendant's Exhibit "F" (R. 017) states: 
Dear Steve: There is one item I neglected to mention in my last letter and that is 
that the mobile home will probably need to be resided when it is subsequently sold that 
this has been disclosed to the Buyer and is accepted. Please sign below and return along 
with the other letter. 
Under Utah law, duress exists when a party's manifestation of assent is induced by 
an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative. 
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 175(1) (1979). 
Two elements must be shown to exist in order to prove duress. First, there must be 
some improper threat made by the other party. Second, that threat must leave the victim 
with no reasonable alternative but consent to the contract. 
Carlsen's counterclaim satisfied both elements in this case. First, there was an 
improper threat by Palatial Living that was negotiated with the lienholder that violated 
Utah's Mobile Home Residency Act because the agreement required the buyer, a third 
party who was no part of the negotiations rather than the lienholder to make the repairs. 
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Secondly, Carlsen had no alternative in this case except to sign both agreements because 
he had previously entered into the agreement on the 6th day of June, 2001 with the 
lienholder, Lyle Cooper to purchase the mobile home and on June 13, 2001, he was being 
deprived of the possession and use of the mobile home. The Earnest Money Purchase 
Agreement (Exhibit "A" incorporated into Counterclaim. (R.017)), shows that Carlsen's 
agreement to purchase the mobile home was on the condition that he would be approved 
for residency by Palatial Living on or before June 6, 200 1, and that he would also be 
entitled to immediate possession of the mobile home on that date and within one hour of 
closing. 
The Earnest Money Purchase Agreement also provided that Carlsen would be 
allowed a walk through inspection of the mobile home one hour before closing. An 
inspection of said mobile home occurred on the 6th day of June, 2001 between Palatial 
Living, Lyle Cooper, Shi Dean, and their attorney, Stephen Jewell one hour before 
closing. Carlsen having previously submitted a lease application to Palatial Living on 
May 30, 2001, which gave notice that he intended to purchase the mobile home was not 
given any notice by Palatial Living or any other party of such inspection. Carlsen was 
required to enter into the Addendum to the Earnest Money Purchase Agreement, dated, 
June 6, 2001 as a condition to purchase the mobile home. (Defendant's Exhibit "B", (R. 
017)). The repairs disclosed in the Addendum, dated, June 6, 2001 differ substantially 
from the repairs required in the agreement, dated June 13, 2001, Exhibit w4E" (R. 017). 
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The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-12, provides: 
No park or resident may agree to waive any right, duty, or privilege 
conferred by this chapter. "Emphasis added" 
There should be no question in this case that both Palatial Living and Lyle Cooper 
could not waive any of their rights, duties and privileges as conferred under the Utah 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act that required the lienholder, Lyle Cooper to make the 
required repairs within sixty (60) days after he received notice. Coleman v. Thomas, 
2000 UT 53, Tf 21, 4 P.3d 783. The trial court in its Memorandum Decision granting 
summary judgment to Palatial Living held otherwise. Lyle Cooper and his real estate 
agent and broker, Shi Dean could not as a part of any Addendum to the purchase 
agreement require Carlsen to make the same repairs that the lienholder, Lyle Cooper was 
required to be make under § 57-16-9(4). The duties of Lyle Cooper to make the repairs as 
required under the Mobile Home Residency Act could not be waived by him by entering 
into the Addendum to the Earnest Money Purchase Agreement which was contrary to § 
57-15-12. Palatial Living also could not lawfully require Carlsen as a condition of 
acceptance by the Mobile Home Park as a resident and being allowed to move in, to enter 
into any agreement that required Carlsen rather than the lienholder to make the necessary 
repairs for the sale of the home under Utah's Mobile Home Residency Act. The improper 
and unlawful coercion on the part of Palatial Living after negotiations with the lienholder, 
renders the agreement of June 13, 2001, Defendant's Exhibit "E" incorporated into 
Defendant's Counterclaim, null and void. Carlsen was therefore entitled to a judgment on 
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the pleadings in his favor and against the Palatial Living as to Count I of the 
Counterclaim as a matter of law and to an award of damages. The trial court erred by 
granting summary judgment as to Count I of the counterclaim to Palatial Living as a 
matter of law. Palatial Living is liable for their violations of the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act, in the same degree as Lyle Cooper. Cooper's wrongful acts in this case 
could not have been accomplished without the aid and assistance of Palatial Living 
Mobile Home Park. 
Subsection (6) of § 57-16-9 provides: 
(6) The prevailing party is entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney fees for 
any action commenced to enforce any rights under this section. 
B. Palatial Living was not entitled to Summary Judgment as to Count II of the 
Counterclaim. 
Carlsen claimed under Count II of his Counterclaim that he was entitled to a 
judgment against Palatial Living for all damages caused by being barred and prevented 
from selling the mobile home unless he first replaced all of the siding on the mobile home 
under June 13,2001 agreement. (Defendant's Exhibit "F" (R. 017)). The June 13,2001 
agreement violated the Utah Mobile Home Residency Act because it required Carlsen to 
replace all of the siding on the mobile home as a condition of any subsequent sale of the 
mobile home. Carlsen as previously argued, was also required to repair and repaint the 
same siding as a condition of acceptance by Palatial Living as a resident. 
The pertinent part of Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4, provides: 
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(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or unreasonably 
limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and unenforceable. 
(6) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to advertise or to 
sell his mobile home. "Emphasis added." 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 57-15-12, provides: 
No park or resident may agree to waive any right duty, or privilege 
conferred by this chapter. "Emphasis added" 
The pertinent part of Defendant's Exhibit "E", (R. 017), incorporated into 
Defendant's Counterclaim states: 
This will confirm our agreement and understanding reached by telephone on 
Tuesday, June 12, 2001 in the above captioned matter. As a condition to acceptance of 
the new owner and permitting him to move into the park, he has agreed as follows: 
"Emphasis added" 
3. To repaint the entire mobile home. 
6. To repair dents and separating seams in the siding. 
The pertinent part of Defendant's Exhibit "F" (R. 017), incorporated into 
Defendant's Counterclaim states: 
There is one item I neglected to mention in my last letter and that is that the mobile 
home will probably need to be resided when it is subsequently sold and that this has 
been disclosed to the Buyer and is accepted. Please sign below and return along with the 
other letter. "Emphasis added" 
Carlsen as argued above claims that he was coerced into signing and executing 
these two agreements, dated, June 13, 2001 that were negotiated between the lienholder's 
attorney and Palatial Living's attorney in violation of the Utah Mobile Home Residency 
Act. Caiisen was also as a condition of acceptance by Palatial Living and being permitted 
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to move into the park was first required to repair dents and separating seams in the siding 
and repaint the entire mobile home. At the same time, he was also barred, restricted, and 
or prevented from selling the mobile home unless the same siding that he was required to 
repair and repaint was subsequently replaced at a substantial cost as a condition of any 
subsequent sale. 
Carlsen not only claims that this is a clear violation of the Utah Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act, but also claimed in his counterclaim that this was also an unreasonable 
restraint upon alienation of the mobile home which was and is against public policy. 
Rancho Santa Paula Mobile home Park v. Evans, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 32 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 464 (Cal. App. Dist. 2 1994). 
Paragraph number two of § IV. of the Rules and Regulations of Palatial Living 
incorporated into Palatial Living's Complaint (R. 003) states: 
2. No subletting, renting, or occupation by more than the permitted number of 
individuals will be permitted. This park is exclusively for owner occupied homes. 
"Emphasis added" 
Not only was Carlsen barred, restricted, or prevented from selling the mobile home 
in this case as per Defendant's Exhibit W'F' (R. 017), but he was also prevented from 
renting or subletting the mobile home by Palatial Living. 
The California Court in Rancho Santa Paula Mobile home Park v. Evans, stated: 
Rules and regulations for mobile home parks can effect various uses. They may 
regulate and restrict parking, noise, use of common area facilities, trash dumping and the 
like. A homeowner may expect such rules to change as conditions change. However, a 
rule prohibiting subleasing goes to the very heart of ownership and residency. Because of 
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the home's immobility, an owner who finds living in the park no longer desirable, 
practical, or possible, would be forced to either sell his home or leave it vacant. 
"Emphasis added" 
Carlsen as alleged in his Counterclaim, found living in Palatial Living Mobile 
Home Park no longer desirable, practical or possible. Carlsen was not only prevented or 
restricted from selling the mobile home as per Defendant's Exhibit "F" (R. 017), but he 
was also barred from renting or subleasing the mobile home which was an unreasonable 
restraint of alienation of the mobile home which is against public policy. 
The United States Supreme Court in Yee v. City ofEscondido, supra, stated: "The 
term "mobile home" is somewhat misleading. Mobile homes are largely immobile as a 
practical matter, because of the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the 
value of the mobile home itself. They are generally placed permanently in parks; once in 
place, only about one in every hundred mobile homes is ever moved. 
Carlsen should have been granted judgment against Palatial Living on the 
pleadings and exhibits under Count II of his Counterclaim as a matter of law. The trial 
court erred by granting Palatial Living summary judgment on count 11 in the counterclaim 
against Carlsen as a matter of law. 
C. Palatial Living was not entitled to Summary Judgment as to Count III of the 
Counterclaim. 
Carlsen claims under Count III of his Counterclaim that he is entitled to a 
judgment against Palatial Living for all damages caused by their unlawful conversion of 
his personal property, including the mobile home located at 481 West 640 North, Logan, 
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Utah to their own use. 
Carlsen contends that Palatial Living and their agents unlawfully converted such 
personal property to their own use when they exercised unauthorized dominion and 
control over the mobile home located at 481 West 640 North, Logan, Utah to the 
exclusion of Carlsen's rights. Pleasant Valley Campground, Inc. v. Rood, 120 N.H. 86, 
411 A.2d 1104 (N.H. 1980). Mobile Home Brokers, Inc. v. Alvin Calvin, Jr. d.b.a., 
Lazy Oaks Mobile Home Park, 566 SW. 2d 68 (Tex App. 1978). 
Palatial Living through their agent and attorney as per Defendant's Exhibit "F", 
(R. 017) incorporated into Defendant's Counterclaim unlawfully converted such property 
to their own use when they exercised unauthorized dominion and control over said 
personal property to the exclusion of Carlsen's rights by unlawfully restricting and or 
preventing him from selling the mobile home. 
Palatial Living and their agents and attorney, unlawfully converted such personal 
property to their own use when they exercised unauthorized dominion and control over 
such personal property to the exclusion of Carlsen's rights as per Defendant's Exhibit "P" 
incorporated into Defendant's Counterclaim. They unlawfully converted such property 
when they attempted to defraud Carlsen of his possession, title, and ownership to such 
personal property by having the lienholder's attorney, Steven Jewell, sign a stipulation 
without any Notice to Carlsen, authorizing conveyance of title and possession of such 
personal property without any valuable consideration. The Defendant's Exhibits 
36 
incorporated into Defendant's Counterclaim shows that Steven Jewell has never been 
Carlsen's attorney, and that Steven Jewell has always acted against Carlsen in favor of his 
client, the lienholder, Lyle Cooper as per Defendant's Exhibit CwE" and Exhibit CwF'\ 
Steven Jewell was barred under Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Practice from representing Carlsen due to the substantial conflict of interest 
because of his representation of the lienholder, Lyle Cooper. Any representation by 
Steven Jewell as an attorney for Carlsen would be materially adverse to the interests of 
his client, Lyle Cooper as the lienholder and vice versa. Such conflict of interest should 
have been apparent and obvious to Miles P. Jensen, counsel for Palatial Living, when 
preparing, signing, and submitting Exhibit "P" incorporated into the counterclaim, 
(R.017) to Mr. Jewell for his signature. 
Palatial Living through their own admissions in their Reply and Answer to the 
Counterclaim, knew or should have known that Steven Jewell was not Carlsen's attorney. 
Palatial Living in this case attempted to gain title and possession of Carlsen's property 
and the mobile home space without legal process through fraud, trickery, and deceit 
which constitutes an additional tort action under the principles announced in the case of 
King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955). 
Palatial Living and their agents unlawfully converted Carlsen's personal property 
to their own use when they exercised unauthorized dominion and control over such 
personal property to the exclusion of Carlsen's rights as per all of the Exhibits 
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incorporated into the Defendant's Counterclaim and particularly Exhibits "Kl", "K2", 
"K3", "K4", "K5f», and "K6", (R. 017). 
Exhibits "Kl", "K2ff, "K3", fc'K4", "K5", and "K6" are documents that Carlsen 
received from Palatial Living management, requiring Carlsen to perform certain acts 
regarding his personal property. 
The pertinent part of the Exhibits, dated, October 12, 2001; October 31, 2002; and 
October 30, 2003 addressed to Palatial Living Mobile Home Residents states: The time 
has come to get our homes and yards ready for winter. Here are a few reminders about 
what needs to be done before it gets too much colder. 
Turn heat tapes on and test to be sure they are functioning properly. 
Drain and cover you swamp coolers. 
Take hoses off the outside water shutoff and store. 
Continue to mow AND TRIM your yard. 
The pertinent part of the Exhibits, dated, April 24, 2002; May 1, 2003; and April 
19, 2004 states: Here are a few reminders of what needs to be done at the end of winter 
seasons. 
Heat tapes can be turned off. 
Always trim your yard following mowing. This is not optional! 
Yards should be watered regularly and during early morning or early evening 
hours in order to maximize the use of our water. "Emphasis Added" 
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The water and electricity at Palatial Living Mobile Home Park is purchased by the 
residents directly from Logan City Utilities. Palatial Living has improperly and 
unlawfully invoked the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7 to authorize Palatial 
Living to regulate the use of water and electricity directly purchased by the resident form 
the City of Logan. Palatial Living ordering a tenant when to turn on and off a heat tape 
would be similar to any landlord ordering a tenant as to when he can turn on or off his or 
her lights. Palatial Living has converted to their own use, the water purchased by Carlsen 
directly from the City of Logan when they claim that it is their water to regulate its use. 
The Exhibit, dated April 19, 2004 also states: Satellite dishes are only to be 
installed on the rear center of the home. If you have a satellite dish that is not in this 
location, you will need to move it. This is considered to be an alteration to the exterior of 
the home and all changes must first be approved by management, according to your lease 
agreement. We will not allow more than one satellite dish per residence. 
This rule regarding satellite dishes and their placement clearly violated The Over-
the-Air Reception Devices Rule 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000 of the Rules of the Federal 
Communications Commission as shown by the Exhibits in the Addendum. Carlsen 
requested the trial court to take judicial notice of the FCC Rules and Regulations. Palatial 
Living's attempts to regulate the use of satellite dishes and their placement violated such 
FCC Rules and Regulations. 
The trial court correctly observed in its Memorandum Decision granting summary 
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judgment to Palatial Living: A conversion is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, 
done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of it use 
and possession. Benton v. State, Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, Dep't of Natural 
Resources, 709 P.2d 362 (Utah 1985). 
Palatial Living's wilful interference with Carlsen's use of electricity, water, and 
satellite dishes, and their wilful interference regarding their restrictions on Carlsen's sale 
of the mobile home together with Palatial Living's attempts to obtain title and possession 
to the mobile home for the lienholder, Lyle Cooper through fraud, trickery and deceit 
constituted the acts necessary for a cause of action against Palatial Living for conversion. 
Carlsen was entitled to judgment on the pleadings under Count III of his 
Counterclaim as a matter of law against Palatial Living for the unlawful conversion of his 
personal property. Mobile Home Brokers, Inc. v. Alvin Calvin, Jr. d.b.a., Lazy Oaks 
Mobile Home Park, supra. The trial court erred by granting Palatial Living summary 
judgment on Count III of the Counterclaim as a matter of law. 
POINT 111 
WHETHER CARLSEN WAS DEPRIVED OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS. 
Palatial Living's Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment on Carlsen's 
counterclaim addressed only three (3) of the seven (7) counts that Carlsen had against 
Palatial Living in his counterclaim. One of the counts not addressed by the court, claimed 
that Palatial Living breached the lease agreement and deprived Carlsen of the use of his 
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mobile home and mobile space by allowing the adjacent neighbor, June Olson to 
intentionally place a boom box radio next to a window less than twenty-five feet from 
Carlsen's main entrance to his mobile home, and play extremely loud and offensive 
classical or gospel music from early in the morning until late at night on a daily basis for 
the entire period of Carlsen's tenancy which was in violation of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Park. 
The Order granting summary judgment in favor of Palatial Living was on all seven 
(7) counts in Carlsen's counterclaim without the court addressing four (4) of the counts. 
Carlsen also filed and paid the statutory fees for jury trial on all issues in Palatial Living's 
Complaint, his Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint which was objected to by 
Palatial Living. (R. 125, 155). 
Carlsen's original counterclaim filed with the court and the subsequent proposed 
Amended Counterclaims included a Third-Party Complaint involving other parties such 
as Lyle Cooper and his real estate agent and broker, Shi Dean. The Third-Party 
Complaint was dismissed by the trial court upon the motion of Palatial Living and not 
upon any motion filed by a Third-Party Defendant over Carlsen's objections. Carlsen's 
objections claimed that Palatial Living lacked any standing to request the court to dismiss 
the Third-Party Complaint against other parties. (R. 335, 338, 375, 780). 
Carlsen was denied his rights to access to the courts as provided under Article I, § 
11 of the Utah Constitution. Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company, 2002 UT 6, 
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^j 41-42, 44 P.3d 663. Carlsen also contends that his right to a jury trial as provided 
under Article 1, § 10 of the Utah Constitution was denied when the trial court failed to 
provide a jury trial on all issues in his counterclaim and his Third-Party Complaint that 
was dismissed upon the motion of Palatial Living and not a Third-Party Defendant. 
Carlsen's final contention regarding the denial of his rights to access to the courts 
occurred when he was denied access to the records in this case when the record was 
transferred from the Clerk of the Court of the First District Court of Cache County to the 
Clerk of the Court of the First District Court of Box Elder County in violation of Rule 4-
205(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-30. No 
change of venue was granted under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-11, and no 
appeal was pending. (R. 1375) to justify the transfer of the record. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
CARLSEN'S MOTIONS TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIM. 
Carlsen next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Carlsen's motion to amend the counterclaim based upon newly discovered evidence. The 
January 30, 2001 letter from Palatial Living's attorney addressed to Brannick Larsen, and 
copies mailed to Lyle Cooper and Shi Dean. [Exhibit V] (R. 272, 347, 365, 696, 703, and 
780) Carlsen also sought to amend the counterclaim to include claims that occurred after 
the filing of the original counterclaim and join Lyle Cooper and Shi Dean as Third-Party 
Defendants. Rule 15(a) mandates that leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given 
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when justice so requires." Utah R.Civ.P 15(a). Moreover, "rule 15 should be interpreted 
liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated. Timm v. Dewsup, 
851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). 
The trial court abused it discretion by denying Carlsen's motion to amend the 
counterclaim to include allegations relating to the newly discovered evidence [January 30, 
2001 letter], and to include allegations of claims that occurred after the filing of the 
original counterclaim and to join additional parties. 
POINT V 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONDUCTING HEARINGS 
OUTSIDE OF CACHE COUNTY. 
The complaint, counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint was filed in the First 
Judicial District Court of Cache County, State of Utah. 
The trial court in this case scheduled court hearings and held hearings in Box Elder 
County with the approval of and some times at the request of counsel for Palatial Living. 
Carlsen filed written objections to the place of the hearings being held in Box 
Elder County rather than Cache County. (R. 812). 
The pertinent part of Rule 77(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: All 
trials upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as convenient in a 
regular courtroom. All other acts or proceedings may be done or conducted by a judge in 
chambers without the attendance of the clerk or other court officials and at any place 
within the state, either within or without the district, but no hearing, other than one ex 
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parte, shall be conducted outside the county wherein the matter is pending without 
the consent of all the parties to the action affected thereby. (Emphasis Added). 
Carlsen therefore contends that the trial court erred under Rule 77(b), UtahRCiv. 
P. by conducting hearing in Box Elder County rather than Cache County where the action 
was pending. 
CONCLUSION 
Carlsen respectfully submits that the Affidavit of Prejudice was legally sufficient 
to disqualify Judge Hadfield in this case. The trial court abused its discretion by denying 
Carlsen's motion to amend the pleadings and by dismissing the Third-Party Complaint. It 
was error for Judge Hadfield to grant Palatial Living summary judgment on all claims in 
Carlsen's counterclaim and the order granting summary judgment should be reversed and 
the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this court's 
decision. 
DATED this 7th day of November, 2007. 
DAVID CRAIG CARL^N 
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